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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
CHARLES E. RICHMOND, Executor 
of the Estate of WILLIAM B. OUT-
CALT, Deceased, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
!VIE W. BALLARD, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8755 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff is the Executor of the Estate of William B. 
Outcalt, deceased. This suit was commenced to set aside 
a deed given by the deceased during his lifetime to Ivie 
Ballard. The complaint is grounded upon the theory that 
said deed was procured by undue influence. The case was 
tried before the court without a jury. Judgment was en-
tered for plaintiff and defendant's motion for new trial 
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was denied. This appeal is taken from the judgment of 
the court and the order denying defendant's motion for 
new trial. 
We call the court's attention to the fact that this is 
an equity case and that it is therefore incumbent upon the 
court to make a complete review of the facts as revealed 
by the record and determine anew where the preponder-
ance lies. Anderson v. Thomas, 108 Utah 252, 159 P. 2d 
142. If the judgment of the trial court is against the weight 
of the evidence it must be set aside. For this reason we will 
attempt to make a complete review of what we feel are the 
material facts of the case. There is no substantial conflict 
in the evidence. (There is a very substantial question, how-
ever, as to whether some of the evidence received by the 
court is competent. See Point I infra.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The deed in question was given by William B. Outcalt 
to I vie Ballard on September 30, 1954. Outcalt died on 
March 9, 1956, and the deed was recorded subsequent to 
his death. Outcalt was 86 years of age at the time of the 
conveyance and had no living blood relatives. Ivie Ballard 
was 63 years of age and a close personal friend of Mr. 
Outcalt. She had served him faithfully during the last 27 
months of his life. 
A Brief History 
Outcalt's wife died about 1950. During the summer 
of 1952, Mrs. Ballard served as his housekeeper for a period 
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of two to three weeks. In April of 1953 Outcalt was hos-
pitalized and operated on for the removal of a rare tumor 
known as a chorioadenoma. When he returned from the 
hospital he required the services of a housekeeper to care 
for the house and prepare meals. He was very dissatisfied 
with the two women whom he had been able to secure dur-
ing the summer and wanted Mrs. Ballard to come and stay 
with him. During the summer and fall of 1953 he told Mrs. 
Ballard that if she would stay with him and take care of 
him for the rest of his life he would leave his entire estate 
to her. Over a period of several months an agreement was 
finally made between the two which was ultimately put in 
the form of a written codicil to Outcalt's will. This was 
executed on December 31, 1953. By the terms of the codicil 
Outcalt's entire estate, except personal effects, was left to 
Ballard on condition that she remain with him and care 
for him the balance of his life. It further provided that 
she should use her own funds for Outcalt's care if his were 
exhausted before his death. On January 4, 1954, Outcalt 
secretly prepared an olographic will revoking the terms of 
the codicil of December 31 and leaving only one-third of 
his residuary estate to Mrs. Ballard. Mrs. Ballard, though 
she was perhaps as close to Outcalt as any living person 
was never told of the olographic will and did not know of 
its existence until after his death. In accordance with her 
agreement she cared for Outcalt from December of 1953 
until his death in March of 1956. 
In January of 1954 Outcalt was operated on for a re-
currence of his tumor. He had a good recovery but the 
tumor began to recur again in May. During the month 
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of July a chemical was used to dissolve the tumor. This 
was successful but Outcalt was bedridden during the months 
of July and most of August. In September his condition 
improved and he was again ambulatory. He moved from 
the basement room upstairs and was "convalescing". On 
September 22, he caused two deeds to be prepared and exe-
cuted conveying some Sandy property that he had sold 
under an installment contract. On September 30, 1954, 
Outcalt executed and delivered the deed in question to Mrs. 
Ballard. Outcalt continued to improve from the latter part 
of August, 1953 until shortly before his death. He died on 
March 17, 1956. 
William B. Outcalt 
Outcalt was characterized by his physician as a gentle-
man of the "old school". He was unusually courteous and 
congenial and had an exceptionally clear and alert mind 
right up to the time of his death. Each witness who was 
asked about his mental faculties remarked about his un-
usual mental prowess. During the latter years of his life 
he had poor eyesight and could read only with the use of a 
magnifying glass. His absorbing interest in current af-
fairs was fed during these years through special phono-
graph records and conversations with his friends and as-
sociates. He was a man of his own will-not easily per-
suaded (R. 251). His doctor remarked that he was "an 
amazingly tough old gentleman" and that even when he 
was critically ill his blood pressure sounded fine and his 
pulse normal (R. 55). The tumor he had, however, though 
theoretically curable, is almost always fatal. Because his 
physicians were unsuccessful in removing all of the tumor 
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at the time of the first operation it became necessary to 
remove or dissolve the same in successive operations. The 
main symptom of the tumor was pain caused by its growth 
and pressure exerted on the adjacent bones and nerves (R. 
51). The ailment had no effect on his mental faculties for 
he remained clear and alert right up to his death and main-
tained the same interest in people and current affairs. No 
claim is made in the pleadings or otherwise that he lacked 
mental capacity to execute the deed. 
Ivie Ballard 
Mrs. Ballard was 63 years of age in 1954. She and her 
husband had been separated for 25 years. At the time she 
left her home to care for Outcalt she had one unmarried 
child living with her. Her physical condition was poor. In 
1950 she underwent an operation to remove a cancerous 
growth (R. 212). Following that operation it was neces-
sary for her to have regular checkups at the hospital (R. 
213). Outcalt knew of her condition and was concerned 
about it. As a housekeeper and housewife Mrs. Ballard was 
meticulous in her work. To Outcalt she was a faithful, un-
tiring, devoted servant. She never complained about the 
long vigils maintained throughout the nights of his most 
serious illnesses; nor of his bizarre habit of eating in the 
middle of the night; nor of the heavy washing which she 
was required to do; nor the other rigorous tasks of pre-
paring meals, administering medicines, keeping the house 
and yard and caring for the person of Outcalt. Her services 
were often required around the clock. As a result of their 
relationship a close personal friendship developed between 
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Outcalt and Mrs. Ballard. To his friends Outcalt referred 
to her as an "angel" and a "godsend." The evidence dis-
closes that she complied in every respect with her promise 
to care for him. 
Plaintiff's Evidence 
The plaintiff called nine witnesses in an attempt to 
establish that t ::e deed had been procured thr~mgh the un-
j,-' 
due influence (- Mrs. Ballard. 
Thomas 1::. Jaddis, a real estate appraiser, testified 
as to the valuE. of the four parcels of real property in the 
estate. In his opinion the property conveyed to Mrs. Bal-
lard had a value of $8,750.00 (R. 45). From his testimony 
and that of the executor it was made to appear that the 
estate left by Outcalt, excluding the property conveyed to 
Mrs. Ballard had a value of not more than $1,000.00 (R. 
44-48, 107) . 
The second witness called by plaintiff was Outcalt's 
personal physician, Dr. John S. MarshaU. Marshall met 
Outcalt in 1953 and operated on him in April of that year 
for the removal of a tumor (R. 50, 51). He attended him 
as his doctor from that time until Outcalt's death in March 
of 1956. After the 1953 operation Dr. Marshall performed 
three subsequent operations. Two of these were made in 
January, 1954, one to remove new growth of the tumor and 
another on the bladder neck so that the bladder would drain 
better (R. 52, 54). The last operation was performed in 
Outcalt's home in December of 1955 to remove a portion of 
the tumor (R. 54). Marshall testified that in May of 1954 
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Outcalt had a recurrence of the tumor and was critically 
ill ( R. 55) . When the doctor was asked if he thought Out-
calt was going to die at that time he replied: 
(R. 55) 
"Well, he was an amazingly tough old gentle-
man. His heart and blood pressure always sounded 
fine <-.~ that time; his pulse normal. He got a little 
touch of pneumonia, but that he tc ~ in stride. He 
was critically ill but I didn't thin was going to 
die at that time." 
In July a chemical was successfully used to dissolve the 
tumor ( R. 58) . Outcalt had been sleeping downstairs and 
was quite feeble during July and August (R. 58). During 
the latter part of August and the month of September, 
1954, he was on his feet again and moved upstairs to his 
bedroom on the main floor (R. 58, 60). During the month 
of September, 1954, he was "convalescing" (R. 60). He was 
stronger at this time and able to move about the home al-
though he still had pain and was required to take sedatives 
at night (R. 58). 
For sleep the doctor prescribed sodium amytal and 
for pain he prescribed percodan and aspirin compounds 
(R. 56). The sodium amytal tablets were taken about 7:00 
in the evening ( R. 55) and percodan was taken about every 
four hours as needed for pain (R. 56). If he awakened in 
the night Outcalt would sometimes take an additional sod-
ium amytal capsule (R. 56). The action of these drugs did 
not cause mental deterioration (R. 62-64). Outcalt's mind 
was always clear and alert right up to the time of his death. 
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The following testimony indicates his mental condition 
during the month of September: 
(R. 61-62) 
"Q. * * * Now did you during the month 
of September call on Mr. Outcalt frequently? 
"A. Yes, sir, I did. I saw him approximately 
well I saw him six times in the month. 
"Q. And during that time did you discuss mat-
ters, other than the state of his health, with him 
during those September visits? 
"A. No sir. We were anxious to get him up 
and moving and get him out. I wanted him to be-
come-
"Q. Did you at that time notice the condition 
of his mind; whether he was able to carry on the 
regular affairs of a person in that condition? 
"A. Yes sir, he was as clear as he could be. 
"Q. Did you ever notice at any time during 
the month of September when his mind was not 
clear? 
"A. I never saw him at that time. 
"Q. Did you ever see Mr. Outcalt at anytime 
during that time that you were his physician when 
you thought his mind was not clear? 
"A. No sir. 
"Q. And alert? 
"THE COURT: Let me understand that. 
"Q. His mind was always clear and sharp. 
"THE COURT: Up to the time of his death? 
"A. Yes sir." 
The doctor went on to point out that there was nothing 
about any of the drugs which affected Outcalt's mind (R. 
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63-65). When asked by Mr. Cannon if there would be a 
time between the taking of the drugs and the main drug 
action when Outcalt could not transact business the doctor 
said: "I guess that would pertain" (R. 71). He never did 
see Outcalt in such a condition, however, and the doctor 
testified on cross examination that the drugs would not 
affect his mental capacity in any way except when he had 
gone to sleep ( R. 70) . The testimony taken altogether indi-
cated nothing more than a possible physical inability to 
transact business which might pertain sometime between 
the taking of the sedatives and sleep. The following testi-
mony of Doctor Marshall is also pertinent: 
(R. 65) 
"Q. At anytime you acted as a physician for 
Mr. Outcalt did you ever see him at a time when 
you felt he was not competent to make a will and 
dispose of his property? 
"A. No sir. I never saw him when I thought 
he was incompetent. 
"Q. Or that he was not competent to make a 
deed. 
"A. I never saw him when he was incompe-
tent to make a deed." 
* * * * * 
(R. 66, 67) 
"Q. Did you find Mr. Outcalt an unusually 
alert person mentally for his age? 
"A. Very alert; exceptionally alert." 
From the summer of 1954 until his death Outcalt's eating 
habits were bizarre (R. 61). Mrs. Ballard was often re-
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quired to get up and cook meals for him during the night 
and at anytime during the day (R. 61). The doctor said 
that Mrs. Ballard would always prepare food whenever 
Outcalt wished it and whatever he wished (R. 61). In the 
doctor's opinion Outcalt was very well cared for by Mrs. 
Ballard (R. 60) and Outcalt said many times to his doctor 
that he was very well satisfied with her (R. 67). Mrs. 
Ballard was just a "housekeeper" said the doctor and not 
a practical nurse or a registered nurse. It was essential 
that Outcalt have someone at the home to take care of him, 
however (R. 65, 68). 
Outcalt had to use a magnifying glass to read (R. 65, 
66). During September of 1954 he was able to read with 
his glass (R. 66). The doctor said that because of his ill-
ness he would expect that Outcalt might well be shaky in 
his handwriting (R. 66). 
A witness to the deed of September 30, George E. Dent, 
was called by plaintiff. He testified that he did not see 
Outcalt affix his signature but that Mrs. Ballard had told 
him that the deed was signed in her presence, so he signed 
as a witness (R. 76). The deed, he said was witnessed and 
acknowledged on December 30, 1954 (R. 76). 
Esther T. Luchesi, the notary who signed the acknowl-
edgment on the deed testified that she did not see Outcalt 
sign the deed but that she put Mrs. Ballard under oath and 
was satisfied that he had signed it and so affixed her sig-
nature. She said the deed was acknowledged on the date 
it bears (R. 80-82). It should be noted at this point that 
no contention was made, nor was there any evidence what-
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soever that Outcalt was not in fact the signer of the deed. 
On the other hand there was positive and direct testimony 
that he executed and delivered the deed in Mrs. Ballard's 
presence. 
Naomi Grace Dent testified that she was a friend of 
Mrs. Outcalt's and that she had typed the deed (R. 83, 84) . 
Charles E. Richmond, the plaintiff and executor of the 
Estate of William B. Outcalt, testified as to the affairs of the 
estate and various of Outcalt's business transactions during 
his lifetime. Richmond had known Outcalt since 1925 and had 
had personal business dealings with him including the pur-
chase of Outcalt's automobile and a loan from Outcalt's per-
sonal funds. In 1949 when Outcalt and his wife were going 
on a trip he gave Richmond and his wife a power of attorney 
so that affairs at home could be handled in their absence 
(R. 87, 88). In 1953 Richmond was asked to be Executor 
of Outcalt's Estate (R. 89). Plaintiff put in evidence Out-
calt's will of May 2, 1953, which left the entire estate to a 
niece of Outcalt's, Annie Brooks (Ex. 3, R. 91, 92). The 
next instrument identified by Richmond was the codicil of 
December 31, 1953, which left the estate, except household 
effects, to Mrs. Ballard on condition that she care for Out-
calt the balance of his life (Ex. 5, R. 92, 93) . Plaintiff 
next offered the olographic will of January 4, 1954, which 
left the niece all personal effects and divided the residue 
of the estate 1j3 to Annie E. Brooke; lj3 to I vie Ballard and 
the remaining 11~ in trust to several named friends (Ex. 4, 
R. 94, 95) . Outcalt never did tell Richmond of the codicil 
of December 31, 1953 (R. 97) or of the olographic will of 
January 4, 1954 (R. 133). Two deeds signed by Outcalt 
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on September 22, 1954, were offered and received in evi-
dence (Exs. 9 and 10, R. 113). 
Richmond testified that Outcalt had cash assets on 
December 31, 1953, (including accounts receivable, but not 
including his checking account) of about $5,683.17 plus 
4lf2 acres of land in Emigration Canyon, 160 acres in Park 
Valley and 30 acres in Tooele Valley (R. 102, 103). At the 
time of his death Outcalt's cash assets had been depleted to 
about $309.47 (R. 102). Richmond and his wife were 
authorized to draw on his bank accounts and used this 
authority from July of 1954 to pay Outcalt's bills for him 
(R. 99, 100). Mr. and Mrs. Richmond would draw from 
Outcalt's savings, deposit the funds in his checking account 
and then pay the bills· by check signing for Outcalt as at-
torney in fact. Mrs. Ballard was given $25.00 per week to 
meet the necessary household expenses including food and 
medicines (R. 110). Richmond testified that Mrs. Ballard 
was paid $25.00 per month for her own use from January 
through July of 1954; $100.00 from August, 1954, to De-
cember, 1954; $75.00 from January, 1955, to February of 
1956 (Ex. 14, R. 114, 115). He said that Outcalt directed 
him to pay Mrs. Ballard (R. 129) but that he (Richmond) 
made the decision to increase the amount in July, 1954 (R. 
130). 
Richmond testified as to Outcalt's illness during the 
summer of 1954 and said that in the fall of 1954 he was 
again up and around but not as active as before (R. 98). 
He mentioned an occasion in late July or early Augus~ 
1954, when he said Outcalt did not know him (R. 108) but 
this developed into a fiasco on cross examination (R. 128, 
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129). At the close of Richmond's testimony a letter marked 
Exhibit 11 was offered and received over objections duly 
taken (R. 138-142). From the testimony of the Richmonds, 
it appears that this exhibit was in the handwriting of Out-
calt and had been found after his death in his bedroom. It 
read: 
"December 1, 1954 
"To the Administrator of My Estate 
"Please settle my estate according to the terms 
of my olographic will written and signed by me last 
January. The provisions of this will are just to all 
concerned and I wish them carried out, ignoring and 
cancelling all other papers which I may have signed 
under undue pressure and fear of being left alone. 
William B. Outcalt" 
This exhibit is discussed in full under Point I infra. 
Lillian Dorsey McConnell was the next witness called 
by plaintiff. She testified that on September 22, 1954, she 
was at the Outcalt residence and witnessed the signing of 
the two deeds executed by Outcalt on that day (R. 153). 
She testified that the two deeds were taken to a notary who 
prepared an acknowledgment even though he had no per-
sonal knowledge that Outcalt had signed the deed (R. 158-
162). Mrs. McConnell further testified that Outcalt was 
competent to make a deed on September 22, 1954 (R. 160). 
Mrs. Esther M. Richmond, the wife of the executor, 
was called to testify as to the signing of the deeds on Sep-
tember 22. She also testified that the deeds were acknowl-
edged out of Outcalt's presence; that the notary did not 
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see Outcalt sign said deeds nor did he discuss the signing 
of the deeds with Outcalt, and further that the notary was 
not even acquainted with Outcalt (R. 173). Mrs. Richmond 
also testified that she found Exhibit 11 in Outcalt's bed-
room on March 17, 1956 (R. 170). 
The final witness called by plaintiff was !vie Ballard, 
the defendant. Mrs. Ballard was examined on the circum-
stances leading up to the execution of the codicil of Decem-
ber 31, 1953. The questions directed to her related only to 
the time prior to January 1, 1954 (R. 183). Since her testi-
mony was repeated when she took the stand on her own 
behalf it will not be abstracted at this point in the brief. 
Following Mrs. Ballard's testimony the plaintiff rested 
his case. Defendant thereupon moved the court for a judg-
ment of dismissal which the court took under advisement 
(R. 193-195). 
Defendant's Evidence 
!vie Ballard testified in her own behalf. She is a 
woman 66 years of age (R. 212). 
During the last week in July and part of August of 
1952, Mrs. Ballard went to the Outcalt home to keep house 
for Mr. Outcalt while he was convalescing from an illness 
(R. 183). Mrs. Ballard had visited Mr. Outcalt as a friend 
on many occasions before this, but this was the first time 
she had performed any services for him. No charge was 
made for these services. He was very pleased with her 
work, however, and was seeking a permanent housekeeper 
to stay with him. 
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During the summer of 1953 Outcalt employed a 73 
vear old woman by the name of Mrs. Fleming to act as his 
rrousekeeper (R. 122). Outcalt could not tolerate this 
woman because he practically had to take care of her (R. 
217). He later told Mrs. Ballard that while this woman 
was at his home he ate out of cans and he just couldn't 
stand that type of treatment (R. 217). After Mrs. Fleming, 
Outcalt employed a Mrs. Miller who stayed with him until 
the latter part of 1953 (R. 123). From the early spring 
of 1953, however, Outcalt was attempting to get Mrs. Bal-
lard to return and take care of him. Following the opera-
tion in April of 1953 Mrs. Ballard visited Outcalt in his 
home (R. 217). He told her at that time "I'm going to see 
that I get you back" (R. 217). He said that he would see 
her when he got well (R. 218). After that he called her on 
the phone and went to her house on several occasions dur-
ing the summer of 1953 to discuss getting her to come to 
his home as his housekeeper (R. 218). On one of these 
occasions Outcalt told Mrs. Ballard that he had $4,000.00 
and could put his hand on the fifth one and he told her 
what property he had. He figured how long the money he 
had would last him and he figured that if she would come 
and live with him they would have enough at least until 
she got her social security on which both could live. They 
figured that Mrs. Ballard's home could be rented and that 
when his funds were gone she would provide funds. He fur-
ther said that if she would come under these terms she was 
to have his entire estate upon his death. He said "I need 
you and you need me" (R. 218). Mrs. Ballard didn't want 
to return to his home, however, because of an unpleasant-
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ness she had had with the niece, Mrs. Brooke (R. 219). 
She asked him to ask the Richmonds if they would accept 
the same proposition and also to write Mrs. Brooke. Out-
calt apparently did this with no success for Mrs. Ballard 
had made it clear to him "I don't want to come unless you 
can't get anyone else" (R. 219). She did say "I will con-
sider it if you can't get anyone else" (R. 219). During the 
summer of 1953, before October of that year, they talked 
it over many times (R. 219). 
On October 12, 1953, Outcalt discussed the prepara-
tion of a will with Mrs. Ballard (R. 184, 219, 220). When 
they discussed attorneys Outcalt said he did not want Can-
non (R. 184). (Probably because he had drawn the prev-
ious will and Outcalt did not want anyone to know about 
the change.) Both Mrs. Ballard and Mr. Outcalt went to 
her attorney's office (Grant Macfarlane) on October 12, 
1953 (R. 184, 220). The preparation of a codicil to embody 
the agreement made between Outcalt and Mrs. Ballard 
was made at that time (R. 220). A codicil was prepared 
and Mrs. Ballard came to her attorney's office to pick it 
up. She later returned it to his office with some penciled 
corrections made by Outcalt (Ex. 17, R. 221). The final 
draft of the codicil was then prepared and Mr. Outcalt came 
into the attorney's office with Mrs. Ballard and signed it 
on December 31, 1953 (Ex. 5, R. 221). It was placed in an 
envelope and Outcalt wrote Mrs. Ballard's name on it in 
his own handwriting (Ex. 23, R. 286). Mrs. Ballard and 
Mr. Outcalt then went to the Continental Bank where they 
secured a safety deposit box and deposited the codicil (R. 
284) . About ten months later at Outcalt's request the 
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codicil was returned to Outcalt's home and kept by Mrs. 
Ballard over the closet in her bedroom ( R. 285, 286) . Mrs. 
Ballard testified that she lived up to her promise to care 
for Outcalt in every detail until the day he died (R. 220). 
The record fully bears out her statement. 
From the time of the execution of the codicil until his 
death Mrs. Ballard stayed in the Outcalt home (R. 225) 
devoting her full time to his care and comfort. Outcalt 
never did reveal to her that he had secretly made an olo-
graphic will revoking the codicil (R. 283). 
Mrs. Ballard occupied one of the two bedrooms on the 
main floor of the Outcalt residence (R. 225). From Jan-
uary to July of 1954 Outcalt personally made out and de-
livered to Mrs. Ballard checks for her own use in the sum 
of $25.00 per month (R. 305). This was done over her 
objection but at the insistence of Outcalt that she should 
rrave a little to help her out (R. 187). 
Mrs. Ballard took care of the yard, kept the house, 
prepared the food, cooked the meals, did the washing and 
performed the arduous tasks necessary to comply with the 
requests and needs for Outcalt's personal welfare during 
~he 27 months she was in his home. 
When Outcalt stayed in the main floor bedroom he 
.vould summon Mrs. Ballard by knocking on the back of 
1is bed (R. 225). When he slept in the basement he would 
1ammer on the walls (R. 225). Always Mrs. Ballard an-
~wered the call. 
The preparation of food was made unusually difficult 
>ecause of Outcalt's habit of eating anytime during the 
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day and the night. Many times Mrs. Ballard would have 
to get up in the middle of the night to prepare and often 
to cook his meals (R. 61, 233). Her personal attention to him 
was made more difficult because of the bladder condition 
he had. She had to wash the bottle of the catheter which 
he had and he would often make a slip in the bed soiling the 
bedsheets (R. 227). This required a considerable amount 
of laundry work. Mrs. Ballard washed as many as fourteen 
sheets in one day in the bathtub (R. 227). Outcalt had no 
washing facilities for her use. Later, some of the washing 
was done by one of Mrs. Ballard's friends as she had diffi-
culty keeping sheets clean as fast as they were needed (R. 
263). 
When the pain was bad Outcalt had difficulty sleeping 
at night. Mrs. Ballard would sit up with him "ever so many 
times" until he ,-.;;as able to go to sleep (R. 227). When he 
was down the basement during July and August of 1954, 
he was in considerable pain at times and Mrs. Ballard 
stayed with him continually (R. 227). It was sometimes 
necessary for her to give him enemas. Despite her physical 
condition she continued to provide this care right up to the 
time of Outcalt's death. 
Mrs. Ballard testified to the illness of April, 1953, 
which confined Outcalt to his home for a few weeks. Fol· 
lowing this he was up and around and called her on the 
phone and visited her in her home on many occasions. She 
testified that he had an operation on January 17, 1953, 
which confined him for two to three weeks (R. 226). She 
also related the recurrence of his illness in July (R. 226). 
On September 2nd or 3rd, 1954, he came upstairs from the 
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basement room to his main floor bedroom (R. 227). Dur-
ing the month of September (as the doctor testified) he 
was improving all of the time and was able to walk about 
the house again (R. 228). Mrs. Ballard was in the house 
when Outcalt concluded the Siggard transaction and exe-
cuted the deeds of September 22 (R. 228). She testified 
that his mind was always clear and alert and that she never 
saw him when she thought he was incompetent (R. 234). 
The happenings on the day of September 30, 1954, 
were related in detail by Mrs. Ballard. On the morning of 
the 30th, Outcalt called Mrs. Ballard into his room and said 
"I want to talk to you." She went over to the side of his 
bed and he took her hand and said "I want you to have this 
house, more than anybody, more than anybody else in the 
world." He said further "I'm going to see that you get it 
because you have proved to me that you have done more 
for me than anybody else has done or would do for me." 
Outcalt then said : 
"I want you to promise, I'm getting this deed 
made out today, and I want you to promise, will 
you stay with me until I die or go?" 
Mrs. Ballard thereupon promised that she would and Out-
calt directed her to get a deed from his desk drawer, his 
tax notice and his glasses. He looked at the deed and tax 
notice and then said : "Now I want you to take this to 
someone to type it. Do you know of anyone?" Mrs. Bal-
lard replied that she did (R. 289-291). It was then about 
10:00 a. m. and Mrs. Ballard took a bus to Mrs. Dent's 
house and had the deed typed. She returned on the bus and 
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Mr. Outcalt again said that she had done more than anyone 
in the world for him. The deed was signed by Outcalt and 
Mrs. Ballard testified that there were no threats or pres-
sure whatever exerted upon him. Mrs. Ballard then called 
her daughter who took her to Mrs. Luchesi's home. Mrs. 
Luchesi said that the deed would have to be witnessed and 
that her daughter would not do. Mrs. Ballard went to 
Dent's home and he returned with them to the Luchesi 
home where the deed was witnessed and acknowledged (R. 
291). 
Mrs. Ballard then returned the deed to Outcalt who 
looked it over and handed it to her and told her again that 
he wanted her to have it for what she had done. He said 
that· Mrs. Brooke was no blood relative and that she could 
"buy you and I out several times." He also commented that 
he did not owe the Richmonds anything (R. 292). Outcalt 
then said: 
"You can go and have it recorded if you want 
to but you might have trouble-you keep this always 
in your presence until I go and then you can have 
it recorded." 
He then repeated that she could have it recorded at this 
time but it "might cause you some trouble" he said (R. 
293). The deed remained in Mrs. Ballard's possession until 
Out~alt's death (R. 293). No one was told about the deed 
or the codicil ( R. 298) . 
Max G. Halliday testified that he typed the codicil of 
December, 1953. Outcalt first came into the law office in 
October of 1953. He (Outcalt) made penciled changes in 
the draft. The original was later executed in the presence 
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of Mr. Halliday who signed as a witness. He testified that 
Outcalt in his opinion was not acting under fraud or duress 
or undue influence at the time the codicil was signed (R. 
116-119). There is not a whisper of evidence in the record 
nor is there a claim made by plaintiff that the December 
codicil was executed under undue influence. There is abun-
dant evidence on the other hand showing that Outcalt and 
Ballard were dealing at arms length and that the codicil 
was the free will and act of Outcalt. 
Virgil M. Taylor testified that he had lived across the 
street from Outcalt for ten years before his death (R. 198). 
Outcalt would often call on the Taylors and chat with them 
in their home. In 1953 Outcalt told the Taylors that he 
was dissatisfied with the other housekeepers that he had 
had (R. 201). He mentioned how well satisfied he was 
with Mrs. Ballard's work (R. 202). On three or four occa-
sions he said that he would like to get someone to come and 
take care of him for the rest of his life in exchange for his 
estate and said that he wanted to get Mrs. Ballard back 
and would gladly give her the rest of his estate if she would 
come back (R. 200, 202). Outcalt visited for the last time 
in the Taylor home during the latter part of 1953 (R. 203). 
Taylor commented that Outcalt had one of the keenest minds 
for a man of his age that he had ever known (R. 202). 
Thelma Taylor, the wife of Virgil Taylor, testified 
with regard to conversations she had had with Mr. Outcalt. 
Outcalt said on a number of occasions before Mrs. Ballard 
came to stay in December of 1953, "If I could just get Mrs. 
Ballard back" (R. 258). He said on several occasions when 
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he visited her home and she visited his that he would gladly 
give anyone all he had if they would just come and take 
care of him (R. 258). He was concerned about going to 
a rest home (R. 258). In October of 1954, the following 
conversation was had between Mrs. Taylor and Mr. Outcalt: 
(R. 259) 
"I was concerned to think that he should keep 
Mrs. Ballard and he should do something for her 
and I asked him one day if he had taken care of 
Mrs. Ballard and he said Yes I have but don't tell 
the neighbors." 
Mrs. Taylor testified that she never did see Outcalt when 
he was not alert (R. 260). 
One of the most convincing witnesses who testified 
for the defendant was 1Yrs. Sarah Ann West. She went 
down to visit the Outcalt residence every little while after 
Mrs. Ballard went to stay there (R. 204). When the wash-
ing became extremely heavy she assisted Mrs. Ballard by 
washing sheets and pillow cases in her own machine (R. 
205). She testified that Mrs. Ballard was taking very good 
care of Mr. Outcalt (R. 208). She had opportunities at 
times when 1\irs. Ballard was away to converse with Outcalt. 
He was always very grateful for what Mrs. Ballard had 
done for him and "he always said she was just like an 
angel to him and he was just hoping that nothing would 
happen to her before he was gone" (R. 208). Perhaps the 
most significant testimony in the case is the following elic-
ited from Mrs. West by the court: (She had already testi-
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fied that Outcalt had told her that he had given Mrs. Bal-
lard a deed to the home (R. 207) .) : 
(R. 210-211) 
"THE COURT: Mrs. West, did I understand 
you to say that this was in December of 1955 that 
he told you he was deeding this place to I vie? 
"A. No-it was, yet I guess it was, because he 
died in '56. Yeah, he told me towards the last there. 
"THE COURT: Did he say he had deeded it 
or was going to? 
"A. No, he said he had. He said he had fixed 
it so that she could have it. 
"THE COURT: And you were in the house 
that is now in question when he said that? 
"A. Yes, uh huh. 
"THE COURT: You said something about if 
she stayed with me until the end or something? 
"A. Yes, if she stayed with him, seen him 
through so he wouldn't have to go to a home or a 
hospital. He dreaded to go out of that home. 
"THE COURT: Well what I am trying to get 
is did he tell you that he was going to give her a 
deed or that he had already given it to her? 
"A. He had already give her the deed. 
"THE COURT: Did he say when? 
"A. No, he didn't tell me when and I didn't 
ask him. He just said that he had so that is all there 
was to it. But he seemed to be very grateful in what 
she had done for him. 
"THE COURT: That is all." 
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Mrs. West further said that Outcalt told her he had given 
Mrs. Ballard the property for the good things she had done 
for him (R. 207) and that the motive was that Mrs. Bal-
lard would see him through to the end (R. 211). Note that 
this conversation occurred in December of 1955. 
Mrs. Pearl Foster was Outcalt's next door neighbor for 
five and one-half years before his death (R. 237, 238). She 
saw Outcalt every day until he was bedridden and often 
conversed with him (R. 238). She met Mrs. Ballard in 
1951 when Mrs. Ballard was visiting at the Outcalt home. 
After Mrs. Ballard came to stay with Outcalt Mrs. Foster 
would have them both over to lunch occasionally (R. 238, 
239). She said that her acquaintance with Mrs. Ballard 
was only that of a neighbor, however (R. 242). Mrs. Foster 
said that Outcalt had told her that he was very dissatisfied 
with the other housekeepers but that he was "very fond" 
of Mrs. Ballard and that "she was the best housekeeper he 
had ever had" (R. 241). The following significant conver-
sation was had between Mrs. Foster and Mr. Outcalt in 
September of 1954: 
(R. 240-241) 
"Q. And what was that conversation? 
"A. Well he told me that he was thinking about 
leavt~ng his home to Mrs. Ballard. 
"Q. What else did he say? 
"A. And he asked me what I thought about it. 
"Q. And did you reply? 
"A. Well, yes I did. 
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"Q. Would you give your reply please? 
"MR. CANNON: I object to that as immaterial. 
"THE COURT: Well he asked her what she 
thought of it. It may have some influence on what 
he did. You may answer. 
"A. Well I asked him how he felt about it and 
he said that she had done more for him than anyone 
had ever done for him and I said, 'Your niece doesn't 
need the property. I think it would be a good thing 
to leave it to her.' " 
(R. 243) 
"THE COURT: And you think this was about 
in 1954 that he said he was leaving his home to Mrs. 
Ballard? 
"A. That's right. I don't, I'm not sure about 
the date." 
Mrs. Amy Pratt Romney was a close personal friend 
of Mr. Outcalt. Mr. and Mrs. Outcalt had rented an apart-
ment from her and after they moved Mrs. Romney and her 
husband often went to visit the Outcalt home (R. 245). 
She testified that Outcalt was getting "very superior" care 
from Mrs. Ballard (R. 248). He was always very pleased 
with the care he was getting (R. 248). She said that Mr. 
Outcalt was well informed and well educated and that on 
all occasions she saw him his mind was keen and alert (R. 
250). vVhen asked if Mr. Outcalt was a man of strong will 
she replied : 
(R. 251) 
"Yes. Mr. Outcalt was not easily persuaded. 
He was a man of his own convictions and his, well 
his standard of living was very, very high. He had 
very definite ideas." 
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Mrs. Romney's husband was very concerned that Mr. Out-
calt reward Mrs. Ballard for the loyal service she had ren-
dered to him and on many occasions Romney said: 
(R. 249) 
"Mr. Outcalt if you do not make things worth-
while for this little lady I will be very disappointed 
in you." 
Mr. Outcalt replied that Mrs. Ballard had been very kind 
to him and kept things in good order and that he had or that 
he would see to it that she was well cared for after his 
demise (R. 248). 
Mrs. May Markham stayed with Outcalt on occasions 
while Mrs. Ballard was away from the residence (R. 254). 
During the July illness she stayed in the residence and slept 
in the same bed with Mrs. Ballard for 4lf2 to 5 weeks (R. 
254). She said that Mrs. Ballard was rendering excellent 
service to Outcalt (R. 255). In October of 1954 Outcalt 
told Mrs. Markham: 
(R. 255) 
"I have provided for Mrs. Ballard that she will 
be well taken care of when I go for her kindness and 
her loving care for me." 
The last witness called by the defendant was Clark H. West. 
He rendered services to Outcalt as a male nurse commenc-
ing in February, 1955 (R. 261). He went to the residence 
twice a week and gave Outcalt a bath (R. 261). These visits 
continued until a week before Outcalt died (R. 263). On 
these occasions he would converse with Mr. Outcalt about 
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current affairs and sometimes about Outcalt's personal 
affairs. Outcalt always expressed satisfaction with Mrs. 
Ballard. He told Clark that "if there was ever a godsend 
it was when he met her and to have her come to his home 
to take care of him during his illness" (R. 263). About 
a month before Outcalt died while Mrs. Ballard was in the 
hospital he had a discussion with Mr. West concerning the 
conveyance of the Outcalt home to Mrs. Ballard. This testi-
mony came out as follows : 
(R. 263-265) 
"Q. Now on these occasions did he ever discuss 
with you the disposition of his property? 
"A. Not until about a month before his death. 
* * * And he said, 'You know I think that Mrs. 
Ballard is one of the most wonderful women I have 
ever met. She certainly has been a friend to me and 
I have provided for her and nobody can take th~ 
home away from her.' He did not say what he had 
done or how he had done it, or anything but 'that 
nobody could take that home away from her.'" 
The case was argued to the court and taken under ad-
visement. Judgment was later entered in favor of plaintiff 
and against defendant. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT I. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN ALLOWING PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 
11 TO BE ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE. 
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(1) The assertions contained in Exhibit 11 are 
not relevant to the issues of the case at bar. 
(2) Exhibit 11 is a self-serving declaration which 
falls squarely within the ban of the hearsay 
rule. 
(3) Exhibit 11 is obnoxious to the opinion rule 
being a mere conclusion of the witness unsup-
ported by accompanying facts. 
( 4) Exhibit 11 was prejudicial. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE 
DEED WAS PROCURED BY UNDUE INFLU-
ENCE IS AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF 
THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT III. 




THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN ALLOWING PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 
11 TO BE ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE. 
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Exhibit 11 is a handwritten letter reading as follows: 
"December 1, 1954 
"To the Administrator of my Estate: 
"Please settle my estate according to the terms 
of my olographic will written and signed by me last 
January. The provisions of this will are just to all 
concerned and I wish them carried out, ignoring and 
cancelling all other papers which I may have signed 
under undue pressure and fear of being left alone. 
William B. Outcalt" 
Mr. and Mrs. Richmond each testified that the letter 
was in the handwriting of William B. Outcalt. Mrs. Rich-
mond said that she found the document in a small drawer 
of Outcalt's desk after his death. Plaintiff's counsel offered 
the exhibit as evidence that the deed to Mrs. Ballard (Ex-
hibit 1) "was signed under pressure and fear of being left 
alone" (R. 139). Objections to the admission of the ex-
hibit were duly taken by defendant's counsel (R. 139-143). 
Defendant's objections were overruled and the document 
received in evidence 
(1) The assertions contained in Exhibit 11 are 
not relevant to the issues of the case at bar. 
Evidence to be admissible must relate to the matters 
in issue and must tend to prove or disprove such matters. 
It must relate to the issues in such a way as to enable the 
trier of the fact to draw a logical inference therefrom with 
regard to the matters in issue. In the instant case the trier 
of the fact could not logically infer any relevant fact from 
Exhibit 11. 
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The first sentence of the letter provides : "Please settle 
my estate according to the terms of my olographic will 
written and signed by me last January." What bearing does 
this sentence have on the issues of this case? Counsel sug-
gested to the trial court that "there is insufficient property 
to make it worthwhile to probate hardly unless this home is 
a part of the estate and that he had reference here in this 
document to cancelling all other papers which he may have 
signed under undue pressure and fear of being left alone 
to anything that he had which depleted his estate or made 
it go otherwise than according to his olographic will. Now 
there just isn't any estate here unless this deed is cancelled 
* * *" (R. 139). It takes but little analysis of the ad-
mitted facts in this case to realize how ridiculous and un-
founded this statement is. The deed did not make Outcalt's 
estate go "otherwise than according to his olographic will." 
The property was not even mentioned in said will. Secondly, 
plaintiff's own evidence shows that Outcalt left an estate 
of approximately $1,000.00. Most people would think that 
this was worth probating. But even more important is the 
consideration that Outcalt's financial condition at the time 
he made the declaration is the important fact and not his 
condition at the time of his death. He had no way of know-
ing what his estate would amount to when he died. The 
evidence shows that Outcalt had seYeral thousands of dol-
lars more in 195-1 than he had in March of 1956, when he 
died. This first sentence of the exhibit therefore has no 
bearing whatsoever on the issues of the case at bar. 
The second and last sentence provides : "The provi-
sions of this will are just to all concerned and I wish them 
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!arried out, ignoring and cancelling all other papers which 
[ may have signed under undue pressure and fear of being 
.eft alone." Plaintiff's counsel claims for this that it shows 
~he deed was signed under "pressure and fear of being left 
tlone" (R. 139). The language employed does not indicate 
that any instrument or paper (let alone a deed) was signed 
:mder pressure. It says "all other papers which I may have 
~igned." It would have been a simple matter for Outcalt 
GO relate his statement to the very deed to which plaintiff 
~laims the exhibit refers. There is no indication from the 
~xhibit that there was any transaction in which Outcalt 
b.ad been imposed upon. There is no time or place and no 
lndication of any circumstances which might constitute 
pressure. But even supposing that the statement could log-
lcally be connected with the execution of the deed, there 
ls absolutely no reference to any pressure being exerted by 
~he defendant. Who exerted the pressure? Was it Mr. 
Romney in his insistence that Mrs. Ballard be provided 
[or? Was it Mrs. Taylor who was so concerned that Mrs. 
Ballard be rewarded? Did he think that Mrs. Foster was 
pressuring him by suggesting that his niece did not need 
;he home and that he should give it to Mrs. Ballard? Was 
1is fear of being left alone induced by something subjec-
;ive or by something that Mrs. Foster, Mrs. West, the Rom-
leys or the Taylors or Mrs. Ballard might have said or 
lone? 
We submit that this exhibit is neither relevant nor 
loes it have any probative value whatever in determining 
he issues of this lawsuit. The trial court's conclusion that 
t related to the transaction in question is wholly unsup-
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ported in logic and reason and the evidence should havl 
been excluded. 
(2) Exhibit 11 is a self-serving declaration which 
falls squarely within the ban of the hearsay 
rule. 
If we assume that Exhibit 11 is sufficiently definite 
and certain to relate to the very transaction in question 
then it is still inadmissible because it is pure hearsay. 
Before defendant's objections to the admission of Ex-
hibit 11 were taken her counsel inquired as to the purpose 
for which the exhibit was offered (R. 138). Plaintiff's 
counsel stated that the letter "indicates that Exhibit 1 [the 
deed] was signed under pressure and fear of being left 
alone and that it is evidence of the invalidity of that instru-
ment." He further stated: "Now there just isn't any es-
tate here unless this deed is cancelled and it is evidence of 
the invalidity of the September deed" (R. 139). The evi-
dence was offered then to prove the truth of the assertion 
made by the deceased. 
Under the hearsay rule self-serving declarations of a 
party are not admissible in evidence in his favor and the 
death of such party does not render such declarations com-
petent. Besides being ordinary hearsay there is a lack of 
trustworthiness of the declarant in such cases. The rule is 
we II stated in 31 C. J. S. 948 where it is said: 
"Generally a party cannot make evidence for 
himself, by his own declarations and it is a well 
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established general rule that a statement of a party 
whether oral or written which is of a self-serving 
nature is not admissible in evidence in his favor. 
* * * Such declarations are equally inadmissible 
when offered by the declarant's representatives, de-
visees, or heirs since * * * the death of a de-
clarant does not render his statements admissible. 
* * * 
"The rule excluding self-serving declarations 
is a part of the hearsay rule and its purpose is to 
prevent the manufacturing of evidence. A self-serv-
ing declaration is one made by a party in his own 
interest at some place and time out of court. * * *" 
In Smith v. Hanson, 34 Utah 170, 96 Pac. 1087, plain-
tiff sought to recover counsel fees from the estate of one 
John Peter Johnson. The only issue in the lawsuit was 
whether Johnson during his lifetime had authorized em-
ployment of plaintiff to bring suit to set aside certain deeds. 
As proof that no such authorization was given the adminis-
tratrix offered to prove statements of the deceased made 
about the time the suit was commenced to the effect that 
he was "not going to sue," that he had not started the suit 
and that he did not know anything of such a lawsuit being 
started. The trial court rejected the statements as hearsay 
and the ruling was affirmed on appeal. Justice Straup 
stated the law as follows: 
"The appellant urges that the declarations, when 
made, were not self-serving, but dis-serving, and 
were therefore exceptions to the giving of hearsay 
testimony. The general rule is that declarations, 
whether verbal or written, made by a person as to 
facts presumably within his knowledge, are an ex-
ception to the hearsay rule if * * * the decla-
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ration was, at the time it was made, against a pecun 
iary or proprietary interest of the declarant * * 
and that he had no probably motive to falsify o: 
misstate the fact declared, which is generally show1 
by proof that it was made ante litem notum. 
* * * * * 
"[I] t cannot be doubted that the rule is firml~ 
established in England and in this country that, i11 
the absence of a statute, the declaration, to be admis. 
sible, must be against either a pecuniary or a pro. 
prietary interest." 
The court went on to point out that plaintiff was required 
to show ( 1) that the statements were not self-serving, arul 
(2) that they were made contrary to a pecuniary or pro-
prietary interest. In this connection the court said: 
"At least it cannot well be said that they were 
wholly self-serving at the time when they were de-
clared. But ''"e are of the opinion that they were 
not against a pecuniary or proprietary interest. 
\Vhile 'courts will not nicely weigh the pecuniary 
interest to any extent' ( 1 Elliott on Ev ., Section 
441), still 'the pecuniary (or proprietary) interest 
of a party must be clear and undoubted, as this is 
the main ground upon which the admissibility of 
this species of evidence rests.' " 
Ruth1·auff. ct al. v. Sill'cr Eing TFcstern ;:l!ining and 
II! ill Com JW n !1. ct al .. 95 Utah 27, 80 P. 2d 338, "·as a suit 
to quiet title to certain lode mining claims. One of the im-
portant issues in the suit was the "intent, purpose and 
effect" of a certain deed giYen by plaintiff's predecessor 
in interest, Chnrle~ C. Ruthrauff, to one Rose Brown. Plain-
tiff sought to show that Ruthrauff himself paid property 
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tax subsequent to the conveyance on the interest which de-
fendants claimed was conveyed by said deed. This was 
offered to show a recognition of the grantors continued 
interest in the claim as evidence of his intent in giving the 
deed. The court in discussing the general type of proof here 
offered, and holding it inadmissible said : 
"It would be at most an implied declaration that 
he [the grantor] still had or claimed an interest in 
the property. But an implied declaration to this 
effect by Ruthrauff is of no more value than his 
express declaration would be in his own favor or 
that of his heirs. An express declaration of a claim 
by a grantor in a deed, self -serving and in dispar-
agement of his own solemn deed, is a nullity. It is 
not evidence in his own favor or of those claiming 
under him. The principal of this rule is well stated 
in 22 C. J. at pages 234-236, title 'Evidence,' Sec-
tions 213, 215, 217-219; Smith v. Hanson, 34 Utah 
171, 96 Pac. 1087, 18 L. R. A., N. S., 520; Diaz v. 
Industrial Comm., 80 Utah 77, 13 P. 2d 307; Baird 
v. Baird, 193 Cal. 225, 223 Pac. 974." 
It was urged below by counsel that the case at bar is 
controlled by the decision of this court in the case of Mower 
v. Mower, 64 Utah 260, 228 Pac. 911. It affirmatively ap-
pears from the record that the trial court admitted the ex-
hibit on the authority of this case (R. 134). The distinction 
between the Mower case and the case at bar is apparent on 
a careful reading of the opinion. In that case the adminis-
trator of the estate of William E. Mower, deceased, brought 
suit to quiet title to certain property and to cancel two 
deeds executed by the deceased. The sole issue in the case 
was whether or not the deeds had been delivered by the 
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deceased grantor during his lifetime. The unrecorded deeds 
in question were found among the possessions of the de-
ceased shortly after his death. They were dated during the 
years 1912 and 1913. Mower died in 1921. 
In order to show that there was no delivery of the 
deeds in question, plaintiff offered to prove declarations 
made by the deceased about the year 1915 to the effect that 
the deeds had been made and put in his deposit box; that 
they [the deeds] would require some revision and that his 
wives could go and get them on his death. The evidence was 
rejected by the trial court as hearsay. On appeal this ruling 
was set aside. 
The rationale of the Mower case is that delivery is 
basically a question of intent of the grantor and that if his 
intent at the time of the declaration sought to be admitted 
is relevant and if the declaration itself is evidence of that 
intent then the proffered evidence is not hearsay. This is 
so because the declaration is offered only to prove the in-
tent of the declarant at the time of the statement and not 
the truth of the declarations. 
The court reasoned that since delivery was a disputed 
fact the intent of the grantor during the year 1915 with 
regard to delivery was a relevant fact tending to prove or 
disprove the issue of delivery. That this was the theory 
of the court is manifest by the following exerpt from the 
decision: 
"There is an exception to the hearsay rule that 
declarations are admissible, where material, which 
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tend to show the intention or state of mind. 22 C. 
J. p. 281, § 297: 
" 'Declarations may be relevant evidence as 
to a particular intent or intention in the mind 
of the declarant. * * * The declarations 
are not direct evidence of the fact asserted, but 
merely circumstantial evidence as to the exis-
tence of some relevant and material fact.'" 
The nub of the matter is reached by the following quote of 
the court: 
"Where, regardless of the truth or the falsity of 
a statement, the fact that it has been made is rele-
vant the rule does not apply, but the statement may 
be shown. Evidence as to the making of such a 
statement is not secondary, but primary, for the 
statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or 
be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of 
such a fact." 
The court went on to point out that the issue of admissi-
bility is often one of relevancy. 
That the facts of the Mower case present a vastly dif-
ferent situation than exists in the case at bar was expressly 
noted in the opinion of the court. Quoting with approval 
from Williams v. Kidd, 170 Cal. 631, 151 Pac. 1, the court 
said: 
"It is, of course, well settled that acts and dec-
larations of a grantor made after he has parted with 
the title to property and in disparagement of it are 
inadmissible when made in the absence of the gran-
tee * * *" 
"But here the very question was whether Wil-
liams had ever parted with title to the property. 
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* * * 'Delivery' is a word of well-defined mean-
ing in the law. It is the act, however evidenced, by 
which the instrument takes effect and title thereby 
possess. Of course it is true that after such delivery 
no acts or declarations of the grantor in derogation 
of his grant will be received." 
The author of the Mower decision referring to the proffered 
declarations wrote: 
"It may be conceded that they are inadmissible 
after the delivery of the deed." 
Applying the rationale of this case to the facts of the case 
at bar it is obvious that Exhibit 11 was admitted in error. 
The letter would have been incompetent even had it ex-
pressly stated that: "on September 30, 1955, while acting 
under the undue influence and pressure of I vie Ballard and 
a fear of being left alone I executed a deed to my home." 
This is so because (1) it is a self-serving statement with 
no guarantee of trustworthiness whatever, (2) the fact 
that the statement had been made is not relevant unless the 
assertions therein made are true, for the reason that the 
statement does not evidence any particular intent or mental 
state of the declarant at the time of the declaration and 
even if it did said intent or mental state at said time 
(months after the deed) is not relevant, and (3) the only 
other purpose of the statement (and that for which it was 
offered and received) is to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted which brings the declaration squarely within the 
ban of the he a rsa~· rule. 
Plaintiff's counsel recognized that the mere fact that 
the declaration had been made regardless of its truth or 
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falsity was not relevant under the facts of this case. The 
statement was offered expressly to prove that a deed given 
over two months prior to the declaration was executed 
under undue influence. For this purpose it was clearly inad-
missible as illustrated by the decisions already cited. 
It appears from the record that the trial court was 
not only in error in allowing the evidence on the authority 
of the Mower case, but that he also had other misconcep-
tions about the hearsay rule. It was suggested by the trial 
judge that the written statement presents a different prob-
lem than would have been the case had Outcalt made only 
an oral declaration (R. 140). As is stated in an annotation 
in the question at 10 A. L. R. 2d 1035: 
"It is well settled, with unanimity of authority, 
that the hearsay rule applies as forcibly to state-
ments in writing as it does to those verbally made." 
The court also was of the opinion that Outcalt could manu-
facture competent evidence by making a declaration in 
December as to the state of his mind in September when 
the deed was executed. This is evidenced by the court's 
remark "Can there be better evidence than what his own 
mind was by his own statement? * * * I don't know 
how you could get a better insight as to what his mind was 
than to what he says it was" (R. 140, 141). This, of course 
is a patent misconception of the hearsay rule. A declarant 
is no more competent to state what his mind was at some 
time two months prior than he is to state any other alleged 
fact: Castle v. Allen, 274 Ky. 658, 120 S. W. 2d 219; Weller 
v. Weaver, 231 Mo. App. 400, 100 S. W. 2d 594; Hughes v. 
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Greider, 194 Iowa 726, 190 N. W. 420; Standard Oil Com-
pany v. Murray, 214 Mich. 299, 183 N. W. 55; Flannagan v. 
Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 152 Va. 38, 146 S. E. 
353; Carter v. Walker, 1 S. E. 2d 483; Heard v. Farmers 
Bank of Hardy, 174 Ark. 194, 295 S. W. 38; Conley's Ad-
ministrator, et al. v. Hall, 261 Ky. 1, 86 S. W. 2d 1015; 
Halsey, Stuart & Co. v. Farmers Bank, (C. C. A. 3rd) 37 
F. 2d 476. 
In Carter v. Walker, supra, it is said: 
"No case has been found wherein approval has 
been given to the admission in evidence of a decla-
ration of intent, inuring to the benefit of the de-
clarant, made out of the presence of the party to be 
affected adversely thereby." 
Outcalt's declaration of December 4, 1954, has no relevancy 
to the issues of this case unless it is true, and it being nec-
essary to rely on the truth of the assertions the statement 
falls squarely within the hearsay rule. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the decedent's letter was 
intended to refer to the deed in question, it is a self-serving 
attempt on Outcalt's part to manufacture evidence in his 
own favor (or that of his representatives). It was made 
in anticipation of litigation or a controversy which the 
statement itself contemplated and made necessary. It was 
an attempt on his part to disparage and discredit his own 
act in making the deed. It was pure hearsay. We repeat 
the statement of the law made by this court in the Silver 
King case, supra: 
"An express declaration of a claim by a gran-
tor in a deed, self-serving and in disparagement of 
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his own solemn deed, is a nullity. It is not evidence 
in his own favor or of those claiming under him." 
and the statement of the court in the Mower case that: 
"* * * declarations of a grantor made after 
he has parted with the title to property and in dis-
paragement of it are inadmissible when made in the 
absence of the grantee * * * " 
It follows that the exhibit was admitted in error. 
(3) Exhibit 11 is obnoxious to the opinion rule 
being a mere conclusion of the witness unsup-
ported by accompanying facts. 
That portion of the exhibit relied upon by plaintiff is 
the statement that papers might have been signed under 
"undue pressure and fear of being left alone." This state-
ment is not competent evidence because it is neither pre-
ceded by the facts from which the conclusion is drawn nor 
is there an opportunity to elicit the facts or circumstances 
relied upon by the declarant. The declarant (Outcalt) is 
a layman. As such he has no greater skill than the trier of 
the fact in drawing inferences from fact. Having a decided 
interest in the matter it is to be expected that his conclu-
sions would be colored by bias and possibly unsupported in 
fact. 
It does not require the citation of authority to estab-
lish that the phrase "undue pressure" is a mere conclusion 
drawn from facts. Not only is the word "undue" a conclu-
sion but also the word "pressure" is a mere opinion or con-
clusion. 
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The importance of these self-evident facts becomes ap-
parent when we consider that in order to find "undue in-
fluence" the fact finder must conclude from the evidence 
that the grantor was acting under such coercion, compul-
sion and constraint that his own free agency was destroyed. 
Anderson v. Anderson, 43 Utah 26, 134 Pac. 553. Persua-
sion, argument and solicitation are not undue influence. A 
person is not prohibited from exerting an influence to 
obtain a benefit. The influence exerted must be wrongful 
and unlawful. It must be "undue" in the legal sense and 
the person acted upon must be compelled to do that which 
is against his will at the very time and in the very act of 
executing the deed. (Cases cited infra, Point II.) What 
seems "undue" to some persons may be perfectly proper 
to others. \Vhat might seem "pressure" to Outcalt might 
be merely persuasion or solicitation to others. In short, a 
lay witness cannot be permitted to decide the very issue 
to be decided by the fact finder from facts and circum-
stances unknown. 
Had Outcalt been a witness and he had testified that 
"undue pressure" had been exerted upon him or that "Pres-
sure" had been brought to bear, his testimony in this re-
spect would have been stricken unless the remarks were 
either preceded or accompanied by the facts from "·hich 
the conclusions were drawn. There is, of course, nothing 
about his death which magicall~· clothes the testimony with 
competency. 
There are no facts stated in this exhibit nor at any 
place in the record which would justify a conclusion by 
the fact finder that the conduct or declarations of the de-
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fendant induced in Outcalt a "fear" which destroyed his 
free agency. 
(4) Exhibit 11 was prejudicial. 
This evidence was the only whisper during the entire 
three days of trial that there might have been something 
improper in the execution of the deed. Aside from this there 
is not a scintilla of evidence tending to support the finding 
of undue influence. No one except the trial judge knows 
the extent to which this exhibit influenced the decision. 
Probably even he is not cognizant of the prejudice the ex-
hibit might have had and the weight given it in deciding 
the case. Some indication of the influence it had is sug-
gested by the following language of the court, however: 
(R. 140, 141) 
"You see this is a statement of the deceased. 
The very issue in this case is whether or not he was 
imposed upon or whether he knew what he was 
doing. How can there be better evidence than what 
his own mind was by his own statement? 
* * * * * 
"I don't know how you could get a better in-
sight as to what his mind was than to what he says 
it was." 
We submit that Exhibit 11 was the deciding factor in 
this case and that it being admitted in error the judgment 
cannot be allowed to stand. 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE 
DEED WAS PROCURED BY UNDUE INFLU-
ENCE IS AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF 
THE EVIDENCE. 
We will not attempt to again summarize the evidence 
in this case. We have already abstracted the testimony 
from which it seems to us clear that the weight of the evi-
dence is contrary to the judgment of the court. 
In reviewing an equity case it is incumbent on this 
court to go over the entire record and weigh the evidence 
produced by each party. Unlike a law case, the court must 
set aside the judgment of the trial court unless it is sup-
ported by the weight of the evidence. Anderson v. Tho'ITUJ1l, 
108 Utah 252, 159 P. 2d 142. We will undertake to briefly 
discuss the evidence produced by the respective parties and 
outline the authorities which we feel are controlling. 
The Evidence 
There is not a scintilla of direct or circumstantial evi-
dence tending to prove the exercise of undue influence by 
the defendant, I vie Ballard. Plaintiff's case is founded en-
tirely upon innuendo. In arguing to the court that the evi-
dence required a finding of undue influence, plaintiff's 
counsel urged the following matters: (a) the transfer of 
the property was unnatural in light of his prior testaments; 
(b) exhibit 11 indicates that the deed was procured through 
pressure; (c) the handwriting on the deed was shaky; (d) 
the deed was not witnessed or acknowledged in the pres-
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ence of the grantor; and (e) there is a presumption of 
undue influence given rise to by the relationship of the 
parties. 
As to (a), there is nothing unnatural about the con-
veyance of the property to Mrs. Ballard. As a matter of 
fact the codicil of December, 1953, left her everything. Out-
calt had no blood relatives. He stated that his only relative, 
a niece, was wealthy and did not need the property. On 
the other hand, by testimony of impartial witnesses, he 
considered Mrs. Ballard an "angel" and a "godsend" for 
the devoted service she had rendered. Before Mrs. Ballard 
came to stay with him he had told her and the neighbors 
that he would give her all he had if she would come and 
stay with him and care for him to the end. He knew that 
he had betrayed the confidence and trust of Mrs. Ballard 
by secretly executing the olographic will of January 4, 
1954. Being a religious person- he likely had pangs of con-
science about it. What under the circumstances would be 
more natural than for him to give Mrs. Ballard a deed to 
the residence to assure that she would have the home for 
the service she had rendered, particularly in light of the 
gruelling duty she had done and the devotion she had shown 
during the months of May, June, July and August of 1954. 
As to (b), Exhibit 11 should not have been admitted 
in evidence or considered by the court as proof. Even as-
suming, however, contrary to law, that the exhibit was 
properly admitted what does it show? As pointed out, 
supra, there is absolutely no evidence contained in the ex-
hibit. It does not purport to relate to a deed. It does not 
say that any paper was signed under undue pressure or 
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fear of being left alone. It refers to no transaction, does 
not relate specifically to any time, place, circumstance or 
person. In short, it has no probative value whatever to 
prove the fact of undue influence. 
As to (c), it is urged that the handwriting on the deed 
was shaky and that this indicated pressure of some sort. 
There was no evidence offered whatever from which one 
could reasonably draw the conclusion that the shaky hand-
writing indicates that the writer was under pressure. The 
only evidence touching the issue was the testimony of the 
doctor that he would expect Outcalt's signature to be shaky 
in view of his illness. Is it not also plausible that shaky 
handwriting could be accounted for by other reasons not 
suggested by plaintiff's counsel? For example, it was a 
great emotional experience for Outcalt to dispose of the 
home his wife had died in. There can be no doubt that there 
were strong sentimental and emotional feelings in granting 
to one you consider an "angel" your most valued possession 
in return for the devotion and care that money cannot or-
dinarily buy. We do not suggest this as an answer, but as 
one of many possible inferences that might be drawn with-
out the assistance of testimony to shed light on indicated 
explanations. We submit that this is no evidence whatso-
ever of undue influence. 
As to (d). the fact that the deed was not witnessed 
or acknowledged in Outcalt's presence is no evidence of 
undue influence. He had executed two deeds in the regular 
course of his business just eight days before and they were 
acknowledged in the same manner. This was not unusual 
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for him and is not a circumstance which should even arouse 
suspicion let alone show undue influence. 
As to (e) , we do not think there was any such rela-
tionship as gave rise to a legal presumption of fraud. (See 
authorities cited, infra.) Even if there had been, however, 
the effect of the presumption was overcome by the weight 
of the testimony of Mrs. Ballard, Mrs. West, Mrs. Taylor, 
Mrs. Romney, Mrs. Foster and Mr. West. Whether or not 
the presumption vanished upon an explanation of good faith 
and fair dealing or retained some evidentiary weight is of 
little significance in this case for in any event the bare 
weight of a presumption was certainly not as great as the 
weight of the evidence produced by defendant. 
Defendant's evidence, unlike plaintiff's, is direct and 
to the issue. The contention that the conveyance was given 
as the free act and deed of the grantor is established by 
the unimpeached testimony of I vie Ballard and corroborated 
by independent impartial witnesses. It would be of little 
value to repeat here the testimony abstracted in the fore-
part of this brief. Suffice it to say that Outcalt had every 
reason to give Mrs. Ballard the property. There was no 
living person so devoted to him. He had promised her the 
home and told others that she should have it. In September 
of 1954 he inquired of Mrs. Foster whether he should give 
Mrs. Ballard the home and Mrs. Foster replied that he 
should. On September 30, he executed the deed praising 
Mrs. Ballard for the service she had rendered and exacting 
a promise from her to stay with him to the end. In October 
he told Thelma Taylor that he had taken care of Mrs. Bal-
lard. Also in October he told Mrs. Markham that he had 
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taken care of Mrs. Ballard. Later he told Mrs. West that 
he had deeded the home to Mrs. Ballard for the things that 
she had done for him and that his motive in so doing was 
that she would stay with him to the end. Before he died, 
he told Mr. West that "nobody can take this home away 
from her." 
There is another very important consideration to be 
made in this case in weighing the evidence. Mrs. Ballard is 
not a mere volunteer but a person who has rendered valu-
able consideration for what she received. This fact was 
considered in Doran v. McConlogue, 150 Pa. 98, 24 Atl. 357, 
where the court under similar circumstances held that there 
was insufficient evidence to prove undue influence and 
commented as follows : 
"In this case the grantee was not a volunteer, 
but a meritorious party, who had actually furnished 
a valuable consideration in the form of substantial 
personal services for a number of years, of which 
the grantor had received the full benefit." 
We submit that a conscientious review of the record 
compels the conclusion that the judgment of the lower court 
is contrary to the evidence. 
The Authorities 
Perhaps the Utah decision closest in point is the case 
of Anderson v. Thomas, 108 Utah 252, 159 P. 2d 142. This 
case was a suit brought by the administratrix of the Estate 
of Celia Thomas to set aside two deeds given by the deceased 
to her son shortly before her death. It was alleged, inter 
alia, that the deeds were procured by undue influence. The 
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:rial court found for the defendant and the judgment was 
tffirmed on appeal. 
Celia Thomas, the grantor, was 86 years old at the 
:ime of the conveyance. She was in failing health and al-
nost totally blind. The grantee was her son who had lived 
;vith her until her death. The deeds were given only a 
~ew months prior to her death and conveyed substantially 
til of her property. The effect of the conveyance was to 
lisinherit six other children. There was testimony indi-
:ating that the transfer was contrary to her intended dis-
>osition of it. There was also other circumstantial evidence 
;vhich plaintiff claimed pointed to undue influence. In 
tffirming the judgment, Justice Wolfe wrote : 
"The plaintiff must do more than merely cause 
a suspicion. There must be some affirmative evi-
dence to show that Richard did exercise a dominat-
ing influence over his mother and thus induced her 
to part with her property. Such affirmative evi-
dence is almost totally lacking here." 
rhe following decisions involving the sufficiency of proof 
,f undue influence will also be helpful to the court. In re 
~avelle's Estate, 122 Utah 253, 248 P. 2d 372; Anderson v. 
tnderson, 43 Utah 26, 134 Pac. 553; In re George's Estate, 
.00 Utah 230, 112 P. 2d 498; In re Goldsberry's Estate, 95 
Jtah 379, 81 P. 2d 1106; In re Ford's Estate, 70 Utah 456, 
:61 Pac. 15. (Each of these cases differ from the instant 
ase in that they are law cases and the appellate court was 
·equired to view the evidence in light most favorable to the 
indings of the trial court. This is not the situation in the 
ase at bar.) It would take pages of this brief to summarize 
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the facts in these cases. Suffice it to say that the court in 
each of said cases found the evidence insufficient as a mat-
ter of law to support a finding of undue influence. Yet in 
these cases the evidence was more convincing of undue in. 
fluence, it seems to us, than in the instant case. The Ian. 
guage of some of these cases gives some insight into the 
rationale of the court. 
In re Lavelle's Estate, the court said: 
"We are aware that '* * * undue influ. 
ence is seldom subject to direct proof, but, as a gen-
eral rule, must be established by inferences and cir· 
cumstances * * *'; but it must also be kept in 
mind that '* * * it likewise is true that a find-
ing of undue influence cannot rest upon mere SUS· 
picion. There must be some substantial facts upon 
which the inferences and deductions are based, and 
the circumstances relied on should clearly point out 
the person who it is alleged exercised the undue in· 
fluenc~ and his acts constituting the alleged undm 
influence.' 
* * * * * 
"* * * The mere fact that testatrix pre-
ferred in her will those who were close to her, ren· 
dering her assistance, and ministering to her physi· 
cal and emotional needs, to the exclusion of her rela· 
tives, who did not give her that care and attention 
does not present an instance of unnatural disposi 
tion." 
The court, in holding as a matter of law that there wa: 
insufficient evidence to support a finding of undue influenCE 
stated as follows : 
"To declare a will invalid upon the showin: 
made in this case would unduly limit the right of , 
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competent but bedfast person, ill and in dire need 
of help, to leave her property to the individuals who 
serve her in the extremity of need. The testratrix 
should not be prevented from devising her property 
according to her own wishes merely because an op-
portunity for undue influence exists; nor should the 
beneficiaries be deprived of their devise because 
such opportunity arose through their service to and 
association with her." 
The test of undue influence is set forth in this case and in 
the Anderson case. It is said in the Anderson decision quot-
1 ing with approval from a Kansas case: 
"To vitiate a will [or a deed] there must be 
more than influence. It must be undue influence. 
To be classed as 'undue' influence it must place the 
testator in the attitude of saying, 'It is not my will, 
but I must do it.' He must act under such coercion, 
compulsion or constraint that his own free agency is 
destroyed. The will or the provision assailed does 
not truly proceed from him." 
Plaintiff urged below that the relationship of Mrs. 
Ballard and Mr. Outcalt gives rise to a presumption of 
undue influence in view of the conveyance. Although we 
do not view this of any great significance in this case, as 
pointed out, supra, we do not believe there was any such 
relationship as would give rise to such a presumption. It 
is true that in certain relationships such as physician and 
patient, attorney and client and mother and child a pre-
sumption arises which the confident must overcome by 
evidence of good faith and fair dealing. This is limited, 
however, to situations involving fiduciary relations or cer-
tain named relations of natural trust and confidence. The 
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rule does not extend to the employer-employee relationship. 
As pointed out by plaintiff's witness, Dr. Marshall, Mrs. 
Ballard was just a "housekeeper" for Mr. Outcalt. She was 
neither a trained nurse nor a practical nurse and performed 
only ministerial tasks incident to keeping house and attend-
ing to Outcalt's personal needs. 
This court in Renshaw v. Tracy Loan and Trust Co., 
87 Utah 364, 49 P. 2d 403, refused to extend the presump-
tion to the employer-employee relationship in the following 
language: 
"The relationship wherein such presumption has 
been indulged are parent and child, principal and 
agent, attorney and client, guardian and ward, exe-
cutor or administrator and heir, beneficiary or dis-
tributee. In other cases the presumption of fraud 
has been given effect where there has been a rela-
tionship of confidence plus other circumstances tend-
ing to show that some advantage had been taken by 
the dominant party with a consequent abuse of con-
fidence. 
"A 'confidential relation' arises by reason of 
kinship between the parties, or professional, busi-
ness, or social relations that would reasonably lead 
an ordinarily prudent person in the management of 
his business affairs to repose that deg1·ee of confi-
dence in the defendant -which largely results in the 
substitution of the will of the defendant for that of 
the plaintiff in the 1naterial matters involved in the 
transaction.'" 
In the instant case there was no showing of a "confidential 
relation" as defined let alone the· "plus" factor required by 
this court. It certainly cannot be said that Mrs. Ballard 
was so entrusted with the management of Outcalt's business 
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affairs as to result in the substitution of her will for his 
in the disposition of the home. Plaintiff took great pains 
to show that Outcalt's business affairs were handled by 
Richmond. 
This case falls within the holding of the Pennsylvania 
court in Doran v. McConlogue, 150 Pa. 98, 24 Atl. 357. In 
that case the alleged confidant was a housekeeper and niece 
of the plaintiff's former wife. She had lived in plaintiff's 
home and purchased the household needs as well as cared 
for plaintiff. It was a suit to set aside a deed involving 
strikingly similar facts so far as the relationship of the 
parties is concerned. The court there said : 
"In reference to the question of confidential re-
lation, we are clearly of opinion that no such rela-
tion existed. The undisputed testimony shows that 
Mrs. McConlogue was for the greater part of the 
time the servant of Mr. Gardner, and from the time 
of his wife's death his housekeeper. In her capacity 
as servant, she performed all the menial services 
required from a person occupying such a position,-
attended to all the cooking, washing, scrubbing, and 
other household duties which devolved upon her,-
until the time of her marriage. * * * We fail 
to discover any evidence establishing a relation of 
trust or confidence on her part, other than such as 
would exist between a master and a faithful servant. 
So far as the relation of a boarder in the family of 
the defendants is concerned, it is quite plain that 
no trust or especial confidence can be held to exist 
between them. * * * We cannot see that, in the 
mere relation of master and servant, there can be 
any implication of confidential relation, and of 
course there is none between a boarder and his land-
lord. We therefore dismiss that portion of the case 
from further consideration.'' 
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See also 100 A. L. R. 875. 
Regardless of any presumption, however, the evidence 
of good faith and fair dealing was more than adequate to 
overcome any evil inference. 
We submit that the clear weight of the evidence pre-
ponderates against the judgment of the trial court and that 
the case should therefore be remanded with instructions to 
enter a judgment of dismissal in favor of defendant. 
POINT III. 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO EQUIT-
ABLE RELIEF. 
We again call to the court's attention that this is an 
equity case. Plaintiff invokes the equitable jurisdiction of 
the court to set aside a deed. As this is a derivitive action 
the plaintiff-executor stands in the shoes of the deceased 
grantor. 
It is undisputed that Outcalt contracted for the services 
of Mrs. Ballard; that in pursuance of said contract a codicil 
was executed; that Outcalt secretly repudiated the contract 
by revoking the codicil in an olographic will executed four 
days later; that Mrs. Ballard entered upon the performance 
of her contract fully expecting to be rewarded by receiving 
Outcalt's estate including the home. It is also undisputed 
that Outcalt executed a deed to Mrs. Ballard. Mrs. Ballard 
testified that at the time said deed was executed and as a 
part of the transaction Outcalt exacted a promise from her 
to remain with him and care for him the rest of his life. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
55 
She is corroborated in this by the testimony of Mrs. West 
who said that Outcalt had told her that he had deeded the 
property to Mrs. Ballard and that he had her promise (or 
the motive was) that she would stay with him and see him 
through. 
Mrs. Ballard labored for 27 months in the Outcalt 
home. She worked night and day for 18 months after the 
deed was signed. As has been illustrated, her work was 
not easy and she was not in good physical condition. She 
had been induced by Outcalt to leave her home and her 
son, and for all practical purposes to become Outcalt's slave 
in return for a promise that Outcalt did not intend to keep 
(as evidenced by the olographic will). We submit that as 
a further assurance that Outcalt would have this woman 
with him to his death he gave her a deed to the home exact-
ing a promise in exchange that she would remain with him 
and care for him. Regardless of this latter fact, however, 
he allowed her to remain in his home devoting her life blood 
to his care without once indicating to her in word or deed 
that she should not receive the home as promised in ex-
change for her services. At no time did he manifest to her 
an intention to avoid the deed or the codicil. Undoubtedly 
he was apprehensive that if he did she would not remain 
with him. 
Mrs. Ballard cleaned the home, kept the yard, prepared 
the meals, and washed the clothing and linen. She was on 
hand at all times to perform the sometimes distasteful and 
arduous tasks necessary to attend to his personal needs 
often far into the night or the following day. She kept her 
bargain in a remarkably faithful and devoted manner and 
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now the Executor of Outcalt's estate seeks to avoid the 
deed which furnished the consideration for which she has 
labored and which in effect would take from this woman 
the property promised for her labors. 
We submit that plaintiff is not entitled to recover in 
this case because no offer to do equity on the part of plain-
tiff has been made and plaintiff comes into court with 
"unclean hands". These general equity maximums are rec-
ognized in this state. In SheU Oil Co. v. Stiffler, 87 Utah 
176, 48 P. 2d 503, Justice Moffat wrote: 
"A court of equity is a court of conscience, and 
any one appealip.g to or asking the aid of such court 
should come into it with clean hands and be willing 
to do equity." 
In Hancock v. Luke, 52 Utah 142, 173 Pac. 137, this 
court said: 
"Being a court of equity they [the parties] 
must do equity. The maxim applies regardless of 
the nature of the controversy * * * Regardless 
of the cause why a contract is not fully performed 
as contemplated when it was entered into the maxim 
applies, and neither party will be permitted to re-
tain anything which would be inequitable and unjust 
under the circumstances." 
See also Swanson v. Sims, 51 Utah 485, 170 Pac. 774. 
It is also a fundamental equitable principal that one 
who has received the full benefit of a contract where it is 
of such a nature that it cannot be restored, cannot have the 
aid of equity to avoid the obligations of the transaction. 
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30 C. J. S. 469; Stowell v. Tucker, 21 Idaho 709, 123 Pac. 
641. In the Stowell case the court said: 
"The predecessor in interest of the appellants 
[Outcalt in this case] received the full benefit that 
could accrue to it from the contract * * * and 
appellants now seek to evade the obligations of said 
contract by invoking an equitable remedy. The ap-
pellants seek equity but refuse to do equity. The 
appellants do not come with clean hands, asking 
equity, but refusing to do equity. * * *" 
The maxim that in order to set aside a deed plaintiff 
must restore any consideration given for it and that plain-
tiff loses his equitable right if restoration is impossible 
applies to deeds procured by fraud or undue influence. 30 
C. J. S. 470; Farris v. Cavender, 323 Ill. 227, 154 N. E. 111; 
Kruger v. Block, 114 Neb. 839, 211 N. W. 173. 
In the Farris case the court said : 
"Equity may not decree that a deed, though 
procured by fraud, shall be set aside, unless the 
party seeking such relief offers to do equity. The 
bill was therefore properly dismissed." 
See 30 C. J. S. 458-499. 
As to the "clean hands" doctrine it is clear that one 
whose conduct with regard to the matter in issue is wrong-
ful by the judgment of honest and fair minded men or is 
offensive to the dictates of natural justice is remediless in 
a court of equity. 30 C. J. S. 481. A further statement 
applicable to the facts of this case is that: 
"Equity will not lend its active aid to a party 
who by artful silence has gained an unfair advan-
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tage over another. One who wrongfully conceals im~ 
portant facts, or who improperly stands by, with 
knowledge of the facts, and permits another to act 
to such others disadvantage, may subsequently be 
barred from equitable relief with respect to the 
transaction involved." (30 C. J. S. 482.) 
We submit that this case falls squarely within the rules 
that prohibit equitable relief if the plaintiff does not have 
clean hands or does not offer (or is not able) to do equity. 
There is certainly no question from the facts in this 
case that Mrs. Ballard's services were rendered as consid-
eration for the home which she received; that Outcalt re-
ceived the full benefit of his contract with Mrs. Ballard; 
that plaintiff has made no offer to restore to defendant the 
value of her services; that it is impossible to restore the 
benefits conferred upon Outcalt as consideration for the 
home; that Outcalt wrongfully repudiated his contract with 
Mrs. Ballard by executing the January olographic will; 
that Outcalt remained silent about the repudiation and 
allowed Mrs. Ballard to continue her services; that if Ex-
hibit 11 referred to the deed Outcalt remained silent about 
his repudiation of the deed, and continued in his silence to 
receive the full benefit of Mrs. Ballard's services. 
We submit that the plaintiff is not entitled to equitable 
relief under the facts of this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we urge that the admission in evidence 
of Exhibit 11 was prejudicial error; that the weight of the 
evidence is against the trial court's finding of undue in-
fluence and that plaintiff is not entitled to equitable relief. 
It follows, we submit, that the case should be remanded 
with instructions to set aside the judgment of the trial 
court and enter judgment in favor of defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GRANT MACFARLANE, 
GRANT MACFARLANE, JR., 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
Suite 300, 65 South Main Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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